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CONFRONTATION RULES AFTER 
DAVIS V. WASHINGTON 
Roger W. Kirst* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, the United States Supreme Court began refining the 
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause doctrine it announced 
two years earlier in Crawford v. Washington.1 In Crawford, the 
Court held that the prosecution could not use a custodial 
statement of an accomplice who was not cross-examined at the 
time the statement was made, and could not be cross-examined 
at trial.2 In his opinion for the Court in Crawford, Justice Scalia 
described the core concern of the Confrontation Clause as the 
use of “testimonial” statements by the prosecution.3 In a single 
2006 opinion that decided both Davis v. Washington and 
Hammon v. Indiana, the Court considered whether a statement 
to the police in a 911 call or at a crime scene is testimonial.4 
The Court affirmed the holding of the state court in Davis5 that 
the prosecution could use certain statements of a domestic 
violence victim to a 911 operator. The Court rejected the 
                                                          
  * Henry M. Grether Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College 
of Law. My research was supported by a grant from the Law College 
McCollum Research Fund. I appreciate the assistance I received from 
Richard Moberly, Anna Shavers, and the University of Nebraska Law 
College Reference Librarians. 
1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2 Id. at 68-69. 
3 Id. at 51-52. 
4 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
5 State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005). 
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holding of the state court in Hammon6 that the prosecution could 
use statements of a domestic violence victim to a responding 
police officer at the crime scene. 
The Court’s focus in Davis was how to distinguish between 
statements to the police that can be used by the prosecution even 
if the declarant cannot be cross-examined and statements to the 
police that violate the Confrontation Clause if the declarant does 
not appear at trial. Part I of this Article will discuss how 
accurate and practical rules for 911 calls and statements at a 
crime scene can be distilled from the language of Davis and the 
Supreme Court’s disposition of several other petitions for 
certiorari in light of Davis. 
Judges, lawyers, and scholars will inevitably ask how much 
guidance Davis might provide on confrontation questions the 
Supreme Court did not address. Part II of this Article will 
describe the cautions in Davis against extrapolating from its 
specific holding to broader rules for other kinds of statements, 
and will assess what Davis might add in the search for broader 
confrontation doctrine. 
Some questions about interpreting the Confrontation Clause 
were answered in Davis, but the scope of the opinion must be 
kept in proper perspective. Part III of this Article will describe 
how a more recent case on the Court’s docket, New Mexico v. 
Forbes,7 illustrates the convoluted history of the Supreme 
Court’s ongoing search for stable confrontation doctrine. 
I.  STATEMENTS BY VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE 
The resources for interpreting Davis include the Supreme 
Court’s disposition of several other petitions for certiorari in light 
of Davis, but the starting point must be the facts of the case and the 
language of the opinion. 
 
                                                          
6 Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). 
 7  2007 WL 632910 (U.S. 2007). 
KIRST 6/22/2007 1:11 AM 
 CONFRONTATION RULES AFTER DAVIS 637 
A.  Reading the Court’s Opinion 
1.  The Facts in Davis and Hammon 
 The first report of domestic violence in Davis was made in 
a conversation between a 911 operator and a woman who 
answered the telephone when the operator called back after a 
call to 911 was terminated before anyone spoke.8 The woman 
told the operator that “He’s here jumpin’ on me again.”9 She 
gave the assailant’s name as Adrian Martell Davis. 
Upon arriving at the scene, two responding police officers 
observed that the caller was very upset, that she had fresh 
injuries, and that she was frantically gathering her belongings 
and children to leave the residence.10 The officers did not see 
Davis at the scene. At the time, Davis was subject to a domestic 
no-contact order. A charge of violating the order was elevated to 
a felony by an allegation of an assault.11 
At trial in Davis the two responding police officers testified 
about what they observed at the crime scene, but they did not 
see Davis at the scene, so they could not identify him as the 
assailant.12 The woman who had called 911 did not appear as a 
witness. In her place, the prosecution offered the tape recording 
of the 911 telephone call, which the trial court held was an 
excited utterance and admitted over the defendant’s confrontation 
objection. The defendant’s conviction on the basis of the 911 
recording was affirmed by the Washington Supreme Court after 
it rejected the confrontation objection raised by Davis.13 That 
court concluded that a victim’s emergency 911 call is not 
testimonial if the apparent purpose is “a call for help to be 
rescued from peril” and if it does not appear to be “generated 
by a desire to bear witness.”14 
                                                          
8 See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2270-71. 
9 Id. at 2271. 
10 See id. 
11 See id. 
12 See id. 
13 See State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 851 (Wash. 2005). 
14 Id. at 849. 
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Hammon also involved a report of domestic violence. 
However, the statement in Hammon came later in that incident 
than the statement in the Davis incident because the prosecution 
did not introduce the initial report that caused the dispatcher to 
send officers to the location. Instead, the prosecution in 
Hammon introduced accusations of assault that were made to the 
officers at the scene by Amy Hammon, the woman who was 
later named as the victim.  
The scene the officers found in Hammon was similar in some 
ways to the scene in Davis—they also found a frightened woman 
and signs of recent violence.15 The scene was also different in 
two important ways—Amy Hammon initially said nothing was 
wrong instead of immediately making an accusation against the 
assailant, and the alleged assailant was still present at the 
scene.16 The statement by Amy that accused Hammon of being 
the assailant was made while one officer talked to Amy as the 
other officer remained with Hammon. Hammon was eventually 
charged with domestic battery and a probation violation by 
committing a battery.17 
At trial in Hammon, the responding officer who had 
interviewed Amy at the scene testified about Amy’s accusations, 
but Amy did not appear. The trial court admitted Amy’s 
statement as an excited utterance and convicted Hammon in a 
bench trial. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected 
Hammon’s confrontation objection.18 That court concluded that 
Amy’s oral statement at the scene was not testimonial because it 
was not “given or taken in significant part for purposes of 
preserving it for potential future use in legal proceedings.”19 The 
Indiana court described Amy’s statement as instead part of a 
“preliminary investigation in which the officer was essentially 
attempting to determine whether anything requiring police action 
had occurred, and, if so, what . . . in the process of 
                                                          
15 See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272. 
16 See id. 
17 See id. 
18 Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). 
19 Id. at 456. 
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accomplishing the preliminary tasks of securing and assessing 
the scene.”20 
2.  Applying Davis to the Facts Before the Court 
In his majority opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia 
described the issue as whether the interrogation produced a 
testimonial statement governed by the rule in Crawford.21 He 
first examined the facts of Davis. Justice Scalia described a 
major distinction between Crawford and Davis as the fact that 
Crawford had involved interrogation “solely directed at 
establishing the facts of a past crime” while the initial 
interrogation in a 911 call is “ordinarily . . . designed 
primarily . . . to describe current circumstances requiring police 
assistance.”22 
In his discussion, Justice Scalia identified four more 
differences between the facts of Davis and the interrogation in 
Crawford.23 First, the caller in Davis was describing “events as 
they were actually happening” rather than events that had 
occurred.24 Second, the 911 caller in Davis faced an ongoing 
emergency, while there was no emergency when the statement 
was made in Crawford. Third, the questions and answers in 
Davis were necessary to resolve the emergency, while in 
Crawford they involved past events. Fourth, the statements in 
Davis were frantic and made in a setting that apparently was not 
safe instead of in an interview room in a police station as in 
Crawford.25 
Together the circumstances of Davis established that the 
primary purpose at the beginning of the 911 call was “to enable 
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”26 That meant 
that the statements of the 911 caller were not testimonial, at 
                                                          
20 Id. at 458. 
21 See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276. 
22 Id. 
23 See id. 
24 Id. 
25 See id. at 2276-77. 
26 Id. at 2277. 
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least until the emergency ended, “when Davis drove away from 
the premises.”27 The statements that were made after Davis left 
“could readily be maintained” to have been testimonial, but the 
petition for certiorari had not raised any question about the later 
portion of the 911 call so the Court did not address it.28 The 
Supreme Court’s agreement with the Washington Supreme Court 
that the initial statements were not testimonial meant that the 
Court affirmed the Washington judgment. 
The Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in 
Hammon because that interrogation was similar to the 
interrogation in Crawford and distinguishable from the 911 call 
in Davis. The formalities of the statement in Crawford such as 
the Miranda warning, tape-recording, and location in a police 
station were not present in Hammon, but Justice Scalia explained 
that none was an essential difference.29 The similarities the 
Court stressed were that in neither Crawford nor Hammon was 
the defendant present during the interview and in both cases the 
statements were answers to police questions about past events. 
The Court explained that the statement in Hammon was made 
when there was no emergency in progress, it was made by a 
person who was then protected by the presence of the police 
officers, and it described past events.30 
The Supreme Court directly addressed the conclusion of the 
Indiana court that “responses to initial inquiries by officers 
arriving at a scene are typically not testimonial.”31 It rejected 
that conclusion if it meant that “virtually any” response would 
be nontestimonial. Instead, the Court stated only that “often” a 
response would be nontestimonial. The Court stressed that a 
nontestimonial statement would involve a declarant making a 
statement to officers as “a cry for help” or “the provision of 
information enabling officers immediately to end a threatening 
situation.”32 Both the fact that the statement was made at an 
                                                          
27 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006). 
28 Id. 
29 See id. at 2278. 
30 See id. 
31 Id. at 2279. 
32 Id. 
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alleged crime scene and that it was made during initial inquiries 
were described as immaterial.33 
In his separate opinion, Justice Thomas argued that Justice 
Scalia had provided a test for identifying a testimonial statement 
that would be unpredictable and not workable.34 Justice Scalia’s 
direct response was a reminder that he had not tried to provide 
an exhaustive test, and an assertion that the Davis test was 
workable for “the cases before us and those like them.”35 He 
also repeated his earlier statements that the Davis test was 
“objective.”36 
3.  The Tests Defined and Rejected in Davis 
Justice Scalia confidently predicted in Davis that 
distinguishing testimonial and nontestimonial statements will be 
“no great problem” because “trial courts will recognize the 
point at which, for Sixth Amendment purposes, statements in 
response to interrogations become testimonial.”37 Trial judges 
faced with this novel task, lawyers trying to anticipate how a 
judge will rule on an objection, and appellate courts reviewing 
the results might prefer a little more guidance about what to do 
with variations on the facts described in Davis. 
It is possible to find practical guidance in Davis that will be 
both substantially accurate in typical cases and not overly 
complicated. A key element in the Court’s definition of 
testimonial and nontestimonial statements is an “emergency.” 
The most significant factor that explains why the outcome in 
Davis was different from the outcome in Hammon is whether the 
speaker was facing an ongoing emergency at the time. As a 
result, one important question is, when does an emergency end? 
The Court described a nontestimonial statement as one made 
                                                          
33 See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 (2006). 
34 Id. at 2280 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
35 Id. at 2278 n.5. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. at 2277. 
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when the speaker was “facing an ongoing emergency.”38 In 
discussing why the facts of Davis involved an ongoing 
emergency, Justice Scalia described how the 911 caller was 
“speaking about events as they were actually happening” and 
making “a call for help against a bona fide physical threat.”39 
He also explained that the statements were necessary to “resolve 
the present emergency” and that the speaker was in an 
environment that was not then safe. He repeated that it was an 
emergency and that she was seeking emergency assistance. After 
the operator had the information to address “the exigency of the 
moment” he explained that “the emergency appears to have 
ended (when Davis drove away from the premises).”40 The 
assailant’s departure from the scene was significant for Sixth 
Amendment purposes, because “[i]t could readily be maintained 
that, from that point on, [her] statements were testimonial.”41 
Justice Scalia described an entirely different scene in 
Hammon—Amy made her statement while “[t]here was no 
emergency in progress.”42 She made her accusations to one 
officer in the living room while another officer remained with 
Hammon in the kitchen, keeping Amy and Hammon separated. 
Amy’s statement was testimonial because she was protected by 
the police who were present. Her statement did not provide 
information to end a threatening situation immediately; the 
immediate threat and danger had ended when the officers arrived 
and separated Amy and Hammon.43 
The focus on the immediate danger to the speaker at the time 
of the statement was highlighted by Justice Scalia’s comparison 
of the facts of Davis with the facts of Hammon. In Davis the 
declarant was not protected because she was alone waiting for 
the police to arrive; she was possibly in immediate danger until 
he left the scene. In Hammon the declarant was protected 
because one officer was with her and another was with the 
                                                          
38  Id. at 2276. 
39  Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006). 
40 Id. at 2277. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 2278. 
43 See id. 
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alleged assailant in another room. 
The definition of emergency in Davis did not include the 
time the officer was gathering information after the end of the 
immediate attack, even if the officer was trying to protect the 
victim from similar harm in the future. That exclusion was 
deliberate. The State had argued in its brief in Hammon for an 
“immediate safety” rule that would include statements made 
after the attack when the police were determining if the victim 
needed shelter or other assistance.44 The Solicitor General had 
argued in an amicus brief that an officer could still be “securing 
the scene” while trying to protect the victim from a repeated 
flare-up of violence.45 
Justice Thomas endorsed this broader view of what 
constitutes an emergency when he argued in his separate opinion 
that Justice Scalia had ignored the possibility that the violence 
could resume if the police departed without taking any steps to 
prevent a recurrence.46 Justice Thomas argued that meeting an 
emergency could include determining whether the assailant was 
still a continuing danger. Under his argument, the definition of a 
nontestimonial statement could include a statement made after 
the police had the suspect under control, but while Justice 
Thomas clearly raised the issue, he wrote only for himself. The 
language of Davis limited the category of nontestimonial 
statements to those made while the speaker was facing an 
ongoing emergency, and described the emergency as ending 
when either the suspect had left the scene or the suspect was 
under police control.47 
The inquiry about when an emergency ends raises related 
questions, such as whether the declarant’s specific role in the 
emergency matters. The explanation that the Davis facts 
involved a nontestimonial statement because it was made while 
the speaker was facing an ongoing emergency does not 
                                                          
44 See Brief of Respondent State of Indiana at 9-10, Davis v. 
Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
45 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent 
State of Indiana at 10-11, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
46 See id. at 2284 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting). 
47 Id. at 2277-78. 
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necessarily mean that every statement made during an 
emergency will be nontestimonial. The rule in Davis may not 
apply if the statement was made during an emergency or about 
an emergency by a bystander who was not personally at risk or 
under a threat of harm. At the same time, the explanation in 
Davis does not necessarily mean that every statement by a 
bystander is testimonial. 
Another related question is whether the kind of emergency 
makes a difference. The explanation that the Davis facts 
involved an ongoing physical threat, that the environment was 
not safe at the time of the 911 call, and that the emergency 
ended when the assailant drove away was a description of a 
specific kind of emergency. Subsequent statements seeking 
medical care might colloquially be considered statements about 
an emergency, but they would not be about the kind of 
emergency that was described in Davis. 
B.  The Supreme Court’s Application of Davis 
At the end of June 2006, the Supreme Court disposed of 
eighteen petitions for certiorari that raised confrontation issues, 
each of which the Court had held while Davis and Hammon 
were argued and decided. In eight of the cases the Court granted 
the petition, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for 
reconsideration in light of Davis.48 This disposition is known by 
                                                          
48 See Billingslea v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006) (No. 05-
7998) (reversing and remanding United States v. Billingslea, 144 F. App’x 
98 (11th Cir. 2005)); Anderson v. Alaska, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 05-
8785) (reversing and remanding Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2005)); Thomas v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 05-9233) 
(reversing and remanding People v. Thomas, No. A104336, 2005 WL 
2093065 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)); Warsame v. Minnesota, 126 S. Ct. 2983 
(2006) (No. 05-8778) (reversing and remanding State v. Warsame, 701 
N.W.2d 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005)); Wright v. Minnesota, 126 S. Ct. 2979 
(2006) (No. 05-7551) (reversing and remanding State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 
802 (Minn. 2005)); Forrest v. North Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006) (No. 
05-6102) (reversing and remanding State v. Forrest, 611 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 
2005)); Lewis v. North Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 05-8875) 
(reversing and remanding State v. Lewis, 619 S.E.2d 830 (N.C. 2006)); 
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the acronym of a “GVR.” In all eight GVR cases, the petition 
had been filed by a defendant. The other ten cases in which the 
petition was denied included five petitions filed by the 
prosecution49 and five petitions filed by a defendant.50 There 
were only seventeen defendants in the eighteen petitions because 
both the prosecution and the defendant filed petitions in a 
Massachusetts case to obtain Supreme Court review of pre-trial 
rulings; each petition raised a separate question about a different 
statement so each is counted.51 The Court’s denial of certiorari 
in one other case in which there was a confrontation issue in the 
state appellate opinion is not applicable here because 
confrontation was not the question presented in the petition for 
certiorari.52 
                                                          
Castellanos v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (No. 05-9171) (reversing 
and remanding People v. Castellanos, Nos. B175888, B181286, 2005 WL 
1763623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)). 
49 See Massachusetts v. Foley, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006) (No.05-769) 
(denying review of Commonwealth v. Foley, 833 N.E.2d 130 (Mass. 2005)); 
Massachusetts v. Gonsalves, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006) (No. 05-674) (denying 
review of Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005)); 
Massachusetts v. Rodriguez, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006) (No. 05-672) (denying 
review of Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 833 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. 2005)); 
Texas v. Lee, 126 S. Ct. 2978 (2006) (No. 05-357) (denying review of Lee 
v. State, 143 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. App. 2005)); Russeau v. Texas, 126 S. Ct. 
2982 (2006) (No. 05-856) (denying review of Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 
871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). 
50 See Hembertt v. Nebraska, 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006) (No. 05-5981) 
(denying review of State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473 (Neb. 2005); Massey 
v. Evans, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006) (No. 05-7157) (denying review of Massey 
v. Lamarque, No. 04-55712, 2005 WL 1140025 (9th Cir. 2005); Greene v. 
Connecticut, 126 S. Ct. 2981 (2006) (No. 05-8187) (denying review of State 
v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750 (Conn. 2005)); Gonsalves v. Massachusetts, 126 S. 
Ct. 2982 (2006) (No. 05-8485) (denying review of Commonwealth v. 
Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005)); Brito v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 
2983 (2006) (No. 85-8766) (denying review of United States v. Brito, 427 
F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2005)). 
51 Massachusetts v. Gonsalves, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006) (No. 05-674); 
Gonsalves v. Massachusetts, 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006) (No. 05-8485). 
52 See Petition for Certiorari, Quintero v. Tennessee, 126 S. Ct. 2979 
(2006) (No. 05-7502) (denying review of State v. Quintero, No. M2003-
02311-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 941004 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005)). 
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In October 2006 the Supreme Court disposed of two more 
similar cases, entering a GVR order “in light of Davis” on both 
a petition filed by a defendant53 and a petition filed by a state.54 
In each case the petition had been filed before Davis but the case 
was not ready for the Court’s discussion at the time Davis was 
announced. 
It is both difficult and unwise to draw any conclusions about 
the Court’s reasons for a single disposition of a petition by 
either a GVR or a denial. By their nature, such dispositions are 
not based on full briefing and oral argument, and there is no 
explanation from the Court.55 The GVR order identified Davis 
as the reason for remanding the ten aforementioned cases for 
reconsideration, but that does not necessarily mean that each 
previous opinion reached an incorrect result on its facts. At the 
same time, the denial of certiorari does not necessarily mean 
that the result in a case or the court’s reasoning in the previous 
opinion was correct. A petition may be denied either because the 
facts do not present the issue or because there is some question 
about whether the Court would have jurisdiction. However, in 
each of these twenty cases the Supreme Court docket shows that 
the petition had been distributed to the Justices for discussion 
once or twice before being distributed again after Davis was 
announced.56 The docket shows that in each case the Court 
requested a response to the petition if a response had not been 
filed. These twenty cases were also a selected subset of the 
confrontation cases filed after the Court granted certiorari in 
Davis and Hammon; other petitions that raised unrelated 
confrontation issues were denied during the 2005 term. 
                                                          
53 Cross v. Kentucky, 127 S. Ct. 44 (2006) (No. 05-10347) (reversing 
and remanding Cross v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-001149-MR, 2005 
WL 1703573 (Ky. Ct. App. 2005)). 
54 Texas v. Mason, 127 S. Ct. 68 (2006) (No. 05-1435) (reversing and 
remanding Mason v. State, 173 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. App. 2005)). 
55 See generally ROBERT L. STERN ET. AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 
279-85 (8th ed. 2002).  See also Communities for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. 
Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676, 680-81 (6th Cir. 2006). 
56 The Supreme Court docket can be found from the Supreme Court’s 
web site at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/docket.html. 
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The disposition of the twenty petitions with ten GVR’s and 
ten denials shows that the Court sorted the petitions after Davis 
was announced. Even though the Court did not explain why it 
sorted the petitions as it did, this is a large enough group that it 
is worthwhile to consider the facts and dispositions of the cases 
to determine if there is any pattern that might provide further 
guidance about the Court’s understanding of the rules in Davis. 
1.  Statements at the Crime Scene to Responding Officers 
a.  Comparing Hembertt and Lewis 
The strongest pattern can be found in the dispositions of the 
cases that resembled Hammon. Those were cases that included a 
statement at the scene of a crime to a responding police officer. 
The Court entered a GVR order in June 2006 in eight of these 
cases in which the trial court had admitted a statement that 
appeared to be testimonial under the test in Davis—either the 
defendant had left the scene before the statement was made or 
the defendant was under police control at the time of the 
statement.57 The Court denied the petition by a defendant in the 
one case in which the trial court admitted a statement at the 
scene that appeared to be nontestimonial under the test in 
Davis—it was made while the defendant was still at the scene 
but was not under police control.58 This pattern can be 
illustrated by comparing the Court’s different dispositions of a 
case from Nebraska and a case from North Carolina.  
The defendant’s petition was denied in Hembertt v. 
Nebraska,59 a domestic assault case that began with a 911 
dispatcher directing two patrol officers to a residence to check 
on the well-being of a resident. At the scene, the officers were 
contacted at first by a man who said he had made the 911 call 
and then by a woman who was bruised and “crying, hysterical, 
                                                          
57 See infra notes 65-69, 87-94 and accompanying notes and text. 
58 See infra, notes 59-64 and accompanying notes and text. 
59 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006) (No. 05-5981). 
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trembling . . .”60 The woman declared that she had been beaten 
and threatened with a knife, that this had happened moments 
before the officers arrived, and that the assailant was still inside 
the house. The officers stopped the woman’s report in order to 
locate the alleged assailant in the house. Inside the house they 
found Hembertt and arrested him. The officers then interviewed 
the complainant. The complainant did not appear as a witness at 
trial. The State’s evidence was the testimony of one responding 
officer who reported the initial accusation of the complainant.61 
The trial court found the initial accusation was an excited 
utterance, and overruled the defendant’s hearsay and 
confrontation objections.62 The trial court did not allow the 
officer to testify about the accusations the alleged victim had 
made in the interview after the defendant was in custody.63 
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Hembertt’s 
conviction after rejecting his confrontation argument. The state 
court concluded that the initial accusations were nontestimonial 
because they were not the product of structured police 
questioning, they were made by a frightened declarant when the 
area and suspect were still unsecured, they were not made in 
anticipation of eventual prosecution, and they were made to 
assist in securing the scene and apprehending the suspect.64 
In contrast to the disposition in Hembertt, a GVR order was 
entered for the defendant’s petition in Lewis v. North Carolina,65 
a case of assault and breaking and entering that also began with 
a dispatcher sending an officer to a reported crime scene.66 At 
the scene, the officer met a woman who was bruised and “in 
shock.”67 The woman reported that she had been assaulted, 
described the assault, and provided some identifying information 
about the woman who committed the assault. A police detective 
                                                          
60 State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Neb. 2005). 
61 Id. at 476-77. 
62 Id. at 476. 
63 Id. at 477. 
64 Id. at 483. 
65 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 05-8875). 
66 See State v. Lewis, 619 S.E.2d 830 (N.C. 2005). 
67 Id. at 833. 
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later conducted another interview of the victim at the hospital. 
The victim’s death before trial made her unavailable as a 
witness.68 Instead, the prosecution called the responding police 
officer and the detective to testify about the accusations of the 
victim. Both hearsay statements were admitted under the State’s 
residual hearsay exception.69 
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction 
without endorsing all of the trial court’s rulings. The appellate 
court concluded that the statement to the detective in the hospital 
was a product of structured police questioning, but that 
admitting this statement was only harmless error.70 The court 
also concluded that the initial statement at the crime scene to the 
responding officer was not testimonial because there was no 
formal interrogation or structured police questioning. Instead, 
the responding officer was fulfilling his role “to collect 
preliminary information to understand what purportedly took 
place, determine if medical attention [was] required, secure the 
crime scene, and possibly identify a perpetrator.”71 The North 
Carolina court quoted the Nebraska opinion in Hembertt that 
described statements made to secure the scene and apprehend the 
suspect as not testimonial.72 
The different outcomes in Hembertt and Lewis invite a 
search for an explanation. Some differences can be set aside. 
For example, the state court opinion in Lewis included a lengthy 
discourse on forfeiture, but that would not explain the GVR–the 
North Carolina court declared that forfeiture was not an issue 
because the State had stipulated that the defendant did not cause 
the declarant’s death.73 In Lewis, the post-arrest accusation was 
admitted at trial and eliminated on appeal as harmless error, 
while in Hembertt the post-arrest accusation was excluded at 
trial; but Davis did not provide any new rules about assessing 
                                                          
68 Id. at 832. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 844. 
71 Id. at 841. 
72 State v. Lewis, 619 S.E.2d 830, 842 (N.C. 2005) (citing State v. 
Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 483 (Neb. 2005)). 
73 Id. at 832 n.1. 
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whether an error was harmless. The trial court admitted the 
initial accusation in Hembertt as an excited utterance, while the 
trial court in Lewis invoked the residual hearsay exception, but 
Davis and Crawford have emphasized that confrontation analysis 
is not tied to hearsay categories. 
The different outcomes can be explained using the language 
of Davis. In Lewis, the assailant was gone by the time the 
officer arrived at the scene. The immediate threat of danger to 
the speaker was over. The state court’s explanation in Lewis—
that the victim’s statement was nontestimonial because the 
officer was conducting preliminary questioning to understand 
and secure the scene, to determine the need for medical 
attention, and to identify a perpetrator—described reasons that 
did not fit the definition of an emergency adopted in Davis. 
Those facts of Lewis were a close match to the facts of 
Hammon, and none of the facts resembled the continued danger 
the declarant in Davis was facing before the police arrived.  
In contrast to Lewis, the assailant in Hembertt had not left 
the scene when the responding officers arrived. The complainant 
in Hembertt had somewhat more protection from the presence of 
the officers than the 911 caller had in Davis, but neither the 
complainant nor the officers in Hembertt were in an environment 
as secure as the scene in Hammon. The complainant faced an 
emergency that had not yet ended. The officers in Hembertt 
were informed that the assailant was still nearby, and there was 
no way the officers could know whether the assailant was armed 
or otherwise dangerous until they found him. In fact, at 
Hembertt’s trial the officer testified that he stopped the 
complainant’s story until he had located and obtained control 
over the suspect.74 The facts of Hembertt appear to present a 
good illustration of what Davis described as a nontestimonial 
“provision of information enabling officers immediately to end a 
threatening situation.”75 
                                                          
74 Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d at 477. 
75 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 (2006). 
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b.  Other Dispositions of Cases Involving Statements at the 
Scene 
The Massachusetts Attorney General made a concerted effort 
to convince the United States Supreme Court to adopt a broader 
definition of nontestimonial statements than it eventually did in 
Davis. In petitions for certiorari in three different cases, 
Massachusetts argued that Crawford should be limited to formal 
statements, and that excited utterances in response to an officer’s 
preliminary inquiries at a crime scene should be considered 
nontestimonial. In each petition, Massachusetts cited Hembertt 
for the proposition that only structured police questioning 
produces a testimonial statement,76 but the Supreme Court’s 
denial of the defendant’s petition in Hembertt was not matched 
with a GVR in any of the Massachusetts cases. Instead, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in all three Massachusetts 
cases. The difference between Hembertt and the Massachusetts 
cases were the facts of each case. 
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves77 involved a prosecution for a 
domestic assault in which the prosecutor had filed a motion in 
limine to allow introduction of a statement the complainant made 
to an officer who responded to a report of a disturbance. The 
complainant subsequently invoked the Fifth Amendment and 
became unavailable as a witness.78 The trial court’s ruling that 
the statement to the officer was testimonial and inadmissible 
under Crawford was affirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court in a ruling on the Commonwealth’s pretrial 
petition for relief.79 The appellate opinion concluded that the 
complainant’s statement to the responding officer was 
                                                          
76 See Petition for Certiorari, Massachusetts v. Foley, 126 S. Ct. 2980 
(2006) (No. 05-769), 2005 WL 3438570, at *9; Petition for Certiorari, 
Massachusetts v. Gonsalves, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006) (No. 05-674), 2005 WL 
3197641, at *10; Petition for Certiorari, Massachusetts v. Rodriguez, 126 S. 
Ct. 2979 (2006) (No. 05-672), 2005 WL 3197639, at *8. 
77 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005). 
78 Id. at 551. 
79 Id. at 551-52, 562. 
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testimonial because, “as the defendant already had left, there 
was no active conflict at the time the officers arrived.”80 For 
that reason, the officer’s questioning was interrogation under 
Crawford and the statement was testimonial. 
On the same day, the Massachusetts court applied its 
conclusion in Gonsalves in two similar cases. In Commonwealth 
v. Rodriguez,81 four officers responded to a family dispute; two 
officers interviewed the defendant outside his home and two 
officers spoke to the complainant and other family members 
inside. The accusations by the complainant and his sister were 
made while the defendant was under police control.82 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the 
statements were testimonial; the declarants did not testify at trial 
so admitting the statements was a violation of the right of 
confrontation.83 
In Commonwealth v. Foley84 there were two responding 
officers to a domestic dispute. The first officer to enter the 
house asked only, “Where is he?” The first officer arrested the 
suspect after a child pointed to a bedroom, and turned the 
suspect over to the custody of a second officer outside the 
home.85 Only after the arrest had taken place did the first officer 
talk to the complainant to assess the situation and determine if 
medical attention was needed; that was when the complainant 
made the accusation used at trial. The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court concluded that the statement to the first officer 
was testimonial because it was made after the scene was 
secure.86 
The denials of certiorari in the three Massachusetts cases and 
in Hembertt were consistent. The denials in the Massachusetts 
cases did not disturb the conclusion that a statement to the police 
is testimonial if made after the suspect had left the scene or was 
                                                          
80 Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 552. 
81 833 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. 2005). 
82 Id. at 134. 
83 Rodriguez, 833 N.E.2d at 135. 
84 833 N.E.2d 130 (Mass. 2005). 
85 Id. at 132. 
86 Foley, 833 N.E.2d at 133. 
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under police control. The denial in Hembertt did not disturb the 
conclusion that a statement to the police is not testimonial if the 
victim still faces a threat from the assailant. The denials also 
identify what the Supreme Court was defining as the end of the 
emergency. 
GVR orders were entered for several other defense petitions 
in addition to the petition in Lewis. Those GVRs were consistent 
with the apparent pattern in Lewis, Hembertt, and the 
Massachusetts cases on when the emergency was at an end. For 
example, in Thomas v. California,87 the suspect fled the scene of 
a domestic assault before the police arrived; the police had the 
scene secured when the alleged victim made the accusations. In 
Forrest v. North Carolina,88 the police responded to a hostage 
situation in which Forrest appeared to be holding his aunt; the 
aunt made the challenged statements after the police ended the 
hostage situation and arrested the defendant. The facts in two 
other GVR cases involved statements of witnesses after the 
defendant fled the scene. In Castellanos v. California,89 the 
defendant had jumped out of the stolen car he was driving and 
was trying to escape from a pursuing deputy when a passenger 
in his car made the particular statement to another deputy. In 
Billingslea v. United States,90 the witness described someone 
who had come into his store shortly after a robbery at a nearby 
bank; by that time the suspect had apparently fled the area and 
could not be located by several responding police officers. 
The facts in two other cases in which a GVR order was 
entered based on a defendant’s petition are not as clear, but it 
appears that neither involved a statement by a declarant who was 
still facing an emergency. In each case, nothing in the state 
                                                          
87 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 05-9233) (reversing and remanding 
People v. Thomas, No. A104336, 2005 WL 2093065 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005)). 
88 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006) (No. 05-6102) (reversing and remanding State 
v. Forrest, 611 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 2005)). 
89 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006) (No. 05-9171) (reversing and remanding 
People v. Castellanos, Nos. B175888, B181286, 2005 WL 1763623 (Cal.Ct. 
App. 2005)). 
90 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006) (No. 05-7998) (reversing and remanding 
United States v. Billingslea, 144 F. App’x 98 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
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court opinion or the filings in the Supreme Court suggests that 
the responding officers were concerned about the safety of the 
scene or locating the defendant at the time the challenged 
statement was made. For example, in Warsame v. Minnesota91 
the state court concluded that the entire statement of an alleged 
victim of domestic abuse was nontestimonial even though the 
responding officer met the victim on the street two or three 
houses from the scene of an alleged domestic assault. The 
opinion did not specify when in the conversation the officer 
learned that the defendant had left in a car, but it also did not 
describe any reason the victim might have been facing an 
immediate threat at the time of the statement. And in Anderson 
v. Alaska,92 the victim of the assault fled the scene, met the 
responding officers at a nearby motel, and returned with them so 
that the officers could check on a second victim. The state court 
opinion did not state whether the suspect was still at the scene, 
but it did not suggest that the officers were concerned about the 
presence of the suspect at the scene. 
The eighth case in which a GVR order was issued was 
Wright v. Minnesota.93 Wright also involved a domestic assault 
and statements made by a complainant and her sister to the 
responding officers after the defendant was in custody. Fitting 
this disposition in the pattern is a bit more complicated than the 
other seven GVRs, because the prosecution had introduced a 
tape and transcript of a 911 call that was made after the 
defendant had left the scene, but before he had been 
apprehended. As in Davis, the 911 callers in Wright expressed 
fears that the defendant might return and cause further harm.94 
However, while the 911 call appears to be admissible under 
Davis, the Minnesota Supreme Court had not decided if the 911 
call alone was sufficient and had not decided if admitting the 
                                                          
91 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 05-8778) (reversing and remanding State 
v. Warsame, 701 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005)). 
92 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006) (No. 05-8785) (reversing and remanding 
Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005)). 
93 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006) (No. 05-7551) (reversing and remanding State 
v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 804-05 (Minn. 2005)). 
94 Wright, 701 N.W.2d  at 804. 
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later statements to the responding officers was harmless error. 
The issue that most probably led to the GVR in Wright was the 
State’s use of the testimonial statements to the responding 
officers, and not the admission of the 911 call. 
The dispositions after Davis of the cases in which a 
statement was made at the scene of the crime did not expand on 
the Davis answers to the related questions about the required 
role of the declarant in the emergency. Where the facts showed 
there was an ongoing emergency that created an immediate 
threat to the declarant, the Supreme Court did not vacate the 
appellate opinion that found a nontestimonial statement. The 
GVR dispositions in the cases in which a statement was made at 
the scene of the crime involved statements that were made when 
the immediate threat of violence or injury was over for the 
declarant, as well as for others at the scene. Both the GVRs and 
the denials of certiorari in the cases involving statements at the 
scene of the crime are consistent with the facts in Davis of an 
emergency that involved a threat of harm to the declarant. In 
some GVR cases and denials of certiorari, the injured victim 
needed medical treatment, but the pattern of the dispositions 
does not suggest that the Court considered the need for post-
assault medical treatment to create an emergency when it sorted 
the petitions for disposition after Davis. 
c.  October 2006 Dispositions 
The Supreme Court disposed of two additional petitions with 
GVRs in light of Davis at the beginning of the 2006 term, three 
days after the conference on confrontation at the Brooklyn Law 
School at which this Article was first presented. One petition 
was filed by the defendant and one by the State; both cases 
involved statements at the scene of the crime. These dispositions 
were consistent with the pattern in the cases the Court had 
sorted in June 2006 immediately after Davis. 
In Cross v. Kentucky,95 the appellate court had allowed the 
                                                          
95 127 S. Ct. 44 (2006) (No. 05-10347) (reversing and remanding, Cross 
v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-001149-MR, 2005 WL 1703573 (Ky. 
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prosecution to use a statement by the victim of an assault to a 
responding police officer; the victim had earlier told the 911 
dispatcher that the perpetrator had left the scene in a cab.96 The 
GVR is consistent with the explanation in Davis that a statement 
is testimonial if it is made after the departure of the suspect 
brings the emergency to an end, and removes the immediate 
threat of injury to the caller. 
In Texas v. Mason,97 the appellate court had reversed a 
conviction on confrontation grounds because the prosecution in a 
domestic violence case had introduced the statement of the 
complainant to the responding police officer, even though the 
complainant did not testify at trial.98 Many of the facts in Mason 
were similar to the facts in Hammon, with one important 
difference: the reported opinion describes the responding officer 
as speaking to the complainant before speaking to Mason, but it 
does not describe where Mason was located. The brief filed by 
Mason in the Supreme Court described the officer as first 
talking to the complainant when she answered the door, and then 
talking to Mason in the bedroom where he was sitting on the 
bed and appearing to have been asleep.99 This description of the 
facts makes Mason analogous to Hembertt and unlike Hammon 
on the issue of whether the police had control of the scene at the 
time of the statement. The accusation was made when the 
complainant was still at risk of attack, so it was not testimonial 
under the Davis definition. It appears that the Texas opinion was 
granted a GVR order because the state court had applied the 
Confrontation Clause to exclude a victim’s accusation at the 
scene that was admissible under Davis. 
                                                          
App., 2006)). 
96 See Cross v. Commonwealth, 2005 WL 1703573, at **1, 5. 
97 127 S. Ct. 68 (2006) (No. 05-1435) (reversing and remanding, Mason 
v. State, 173 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. App. 2005)). 
98 Mason v. State, 173 S.W.3d at 111-12. 
99 Brief of Respondent in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 2, Texas v. Mason, 127 S. Ct. 68 (2006) (No. 05-1435). 
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2.  911 Calls 
There were two cases the Supreme Court sorted for 
disposition after Davis involving only a 911 call. In both cases, 
the Court denied the defendant’s petition for certiorari. The 
pattern in these cases is consistent with the pattern in the cases 
involving a statement at the scene. In addition, these cases 
highlight the importance of the related question about the 
required role of the declarant. 
The case that most clearly matched the facts of Davis was 
United States v. Brito.100 In Brito, there were two calls made to 
911, one from a man in an office who heard gunshots in a 
saloon parking lot and one about the same incident from a 
woman in a passing car.101 The man who made the first 911 call 
was not apparently at any risk from the shooter, but that man 
testified at trial; there was no confrontation issue about that call. 
The second 911 call came from an anonymous woman who did 
not testify at trial. The tape of that 911 call included statements 
that supported the government’s case as well as this comment: 
But I was just saying to my son when I was getting in 
the car that I didn’t come to Brockton to die. And 
when I was pulling out and backing out driving down 
the street, he pointed a gun at me and acted like he 
was shooting at my car.102 
The caller then continued by describing where the shooter 
was standing and what his gun looked like.103 
Brito was convicted of possession of a firearm by a 
convicted felon and by an illegal alien, so there was no victim as 
in Davis or in the other domestic violence cases. Nevertheless, 
the 911 call supports an objective finding that the 911 caller 
appeared to be facing an immediate threat from an armed man at 
the time she made the statements about what was then 
                                                          
100 United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
Brito v. United States. 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006). 
101 Id. at 56. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
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happening. The First Circuit held that the second 911 call did 
not create a confrontation violation.104 The Supreme Court’s 
denial of certiorari in Brito is consistent with the Davis 
description of a nontestimonial statement as one made while the 
declarant was facing an immediately threatening emergency. 
In the second case involving only a 911 call, Massey v. 
Lamarque,105 the declarant in the 911 call was not facing the 
kind of immediate emergency as in Davis. Massey involved a 
murder prosecution for a shooting outside of an apartment 
building. The prosecution’s evidence included statements by an 
11-year-old girl who went to an apartment after the shooting and 
talked to the 911 operator who had called back because an 
earlier call had been hung-up.106 Other evidence showed that the 
shooter had immediately fled the scene.107 The appellate record 
before the Supreme Court noted that a police officer had 
testified that he and his partner heard the shooting, looked over 
a wall and saw the victim on the ground, and immediately drove 
to the scene.108 Nothing in the 911 conversation indicated that 
the 11-year-old had been threatened or feared for her own 
safety, but no one foresaw the need to present evidence on the 
issue raised by Davis. 
Other facts in Massey make it more difficult to know how to 
classify the denial of certiorari. Massey was not a direct appeal 
from the state court conviction. The conviction in Massey had 
been affirmed by a California District Court of Appeal in an 
opinion that rejected a hearsay objection to the 911 call, but did 
not mention confrontation or any federal constitutional issue.109 
                                                          
104 Id. at 62-63. 
105 Massey v. Lamarque, No. 04-55712, 2005 WL 1140025 (9th Cir. 
May 9, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006). 
106 See People v. Massey, No. B148256, 2002 WL 16086, at *1 (Cal. 
Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2002). 
107 Id. 
108 Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge, 
Massey v. Lamarque, No. CV 03-1703-AHM (PLA) at 3 (C.D. Cal., Dec. 
24, 2003) (Appendix B to Petition for Certiorari, Massey v. Lamarque., 126 
S. Ct. 2979 (2006)). 
109 See id. 
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This petition was filed after Massey lost his statutory habeas 
action in federal court. In a memorandum written before 
Crawford, the United States Magistrate Judge recommended 
rejecting the confrontation claim because the 911 tape was a 
spontaneous statement that was admissible under a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception, and that therefore it had adequate indicia of 
reliability.110 The Ninth Circuit, in an unsigned and unpublished 
memorandum opinion, found that the 911 tape was not 
testimonial, with a citation to an earlier Ninth Circuit opinion 
which stated that 911 calls were not the evil at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed.111 
The facts of Massey appear closer to the facts of Hammon 
than Davis, and the Ninth Circuit’s explanation is not supported 
by Davis. This might suggest that the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion 
in Massey should be reconsidered after Davis, but Massey’s 
handwritten pro se petition was denied instead of being granted a 
GVR order. There are two possible explanations for this result. 
One is that in sorting the cases after Davis, the Court saw no 
difference between a 911 call from someone facing an 
immediate threat and a 911 call from a frightened child who was 
not facing a threat herself. The other explanation is that the 
confrontation issue was not sufficiently preserved and presented. 
The confrontation issue had not been raised in state court and 
the federal courts had avoided deciding whether it was properly 
preserved. In addition, other witnesses to the shooting did 
testify. The state appellate opinion did not have any reason to 
discuss whether any constitutional error was harmless, but it had 
suggested that any error in the hearsay ruling was harmless.112 
The second explanation appears to be the more likely reason for 
the Court’s denial, which means that the disposition of Massey 
should not be considered as suggesting that a 911 call can be 
nontestimonial under Davis if the 911 caller is not facing any 
danger. 
                                                          
110 Id. at 10 (Appendix B to Petition for Certiorari, Massey v. 
Lamarque., 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006)). 
111 See Massey v. Lamarque, 2005 WL 1140025, at *1 (citing Leavitt v. 
Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 830 n. 22 (9th Cir. 2004). 
112 See People v. Massey,  2002 WL 16086, at *3. 
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The few cases involving 911 calls may not answer every 
question, but they are a reminder that Davis did not endorse the 
routine admission of all 911 calls. In fact, the Court did deny a 
defendant’s Petition in one other post-Davis case that involved a 
911 call.113 This case has not been included in this analysis 
because the state court’s finding that the confrontation issue had 
not been preserved makes it doubtful that the denial of certiorari 
was based on the facts. If the Court did consider the facts, the 
denial would be fully consistent with Davis. The declarant was 
facing an immediate emergency because the 911 call apparently 
was made during a domestic dispute as the defendant was trying 
to force his way into the caller’s home.114 
3.  Other Kinds of Statements 
After Davis the Court denied the petitions for certiorari in 
three cases that involved facts unlike those in Davis. In Texas v. 
Russeau,115 the State argued that it should be able to use Prison 
Discipline Records as business records without providing the 
defendant with an opportunity to confront the declarants. In 
Texas v. Lee,116 the State asked the Court to allow the 
prosecution to use the statement of an accomplice during a 
custodial interrogation because it was the product of informal 
questioning. In Gonsalves v. Massachusetts,117 the defendant 
challenged a state court conclusion that a victim’s hearsay 
statement to her mother was not testimonial. Each case is a 
reminder that there are still many unresolved issues after 
                                                          
113 Marino v. New York, 126 S. Ct. 2930 (2006) (No. 05-8925) 
(denying review of People v. Marino, 800 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2005)). 
114 Brief of Respondent New York to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2-
3, Marino v. New York, 126 S. Ct. 2930 (2006) (No. 05-8925). 
115 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006) (No. 05-856) (denying review of Russeau v. 
State, 171 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). 
116 126 S. Ct. 2978 (2006) (No. 05-357) (denying review of Lee v. 
State, 143 S.W.3d 565 (Tex. App. 2005)). 
117 126 S. Ct. 2982 (2006) (No. 05-8485) (denying review of 
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005)). 
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Crawford and Davis, but there is no pattern that might provide 
further information about interpreting Davis. 
The last disposition to be discussed is an example of the 
importance of considering the facts of a case before accepting 
the language of an opinion as an authoritative holding. The facts 
of Greene v. Connecticut118 involved a gang shooting in which 
Greene sprayed a crowd with 70 bullets from an assault weapon 
before he fled the scene.119 He was eventually convicted of 
manslaughter, two conspiracies, five counts of first degree 
assault, and possession of an assault weapon; he also plead 
guilty to three counts of theft of a firearm.120 One of the persons 
assaulted was Harris, a bystander who later spoke to an officer 
at the scene. After a lengthy discussion of confrontation 
doctrine, the state court concluded that Harris’ statement was 
nontestimonial hearsay.121 The only issue in Greene’s petition 
was the state court’s interpretation of confrontation doctrine, 
with a request to hold the case until Davis and Hammon were 
decided. 
However, the closest the state court opinion in Greene came 
to describing a hearsay statement by Harris was this answer 
from the officer after the prosecutor asked who had approached 
him at the scene of the shooting: “A black man, I believe his 
name was Mr. [Harris] who stated - he came up to me and said 
he was shot in the foot, in the right foot, and there was a hole in 
his boot and he was grazed.”122 After testifying about that 
statement, the officer testified that he had the fire department 
examine Harris, and that Harris declined an ambulance because 
he could go to the hospital on his own.123 Another officer 
testified there was a report on the police radio of a sixth victim, 
and hospital records confirmed that Harris did have a bullet in 
                                                          
118 126 S. Ct. 2981 (2006) (No. 05-8187) (denying review of State v. 
Greene, 874 A.2d 750 (Conn. 2005)). 
119 See Greene, 874 A.2d at 757. 
120 See id. at 755-56. 
121 Id. at 771-76. 
122 See id. at 772. 
123 Id. 
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his foot.124 The defendant did not object to this evidence, and 
did not cross-examine either officer about Harris.125 
The first question in Greene should have been whether there 
was an out-of-court statement offered for its truth. The officer’s 
observation provided direct evidence that Harris had been shot. 
Harris did not say Greene shot him, or even when or where he 
had been shot. The statement by Harris explained why the 
officer looked at Harris’ foot and had the fire department look at 
his foot, but that nonhearsay use of the statement does not raise 
a confrontation issue. As a result, the petition by Greene 
involved a state court opinion that apparently reached the right 
result even if for the wrong reason, an issue that affected only a 
minor part of the charges in the case, and facts that did not 
present a confrontation issue. The defendant asserted another 
confrontation violation in the admission of Harris’ statements at 
the hospital, but the state court opinion did not discuss that issue 
and neither the state court opinion nor the petition for certiorari 
mentions any objection to that evidence. For all these reasons, 
the denial of certiorari in Greene provides no guidance for 
interpreting Davis. 
C.  Restating Davis as Rules 
Justice Blackmun provided valuable advice in Ohio v. 
Roberts when he suggested that any confrontation rule should 
consider “the need for certainty in the workaday world of 
conducting criminal trials.”126 Every condition, exception, and 
modification that might make a rule a bit more accurate may at 
the same time make it too complex to be applied consistently. 
Trying to state every condition in a single rule may produce a 
rule that is awkward or inaccurate in practice. Since the end of 
an ongoing emergency is the most dominant factor in the 
Court’s confrontation analysis of a victim’s statement at the 
scene of domestic violence, the effect of Davis and the post-
                                                          
124 Id. 
125 See State v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750, 772 (Conn. 2005). 
126 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
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Davis dispositions on the admissibility of the complainant’s 
accusation at the scene of a crime of violence can be restated in 
this way: 
A complainant’s accusation about domestic or other 
violence that has just occurred is TESTIMONIAL if 
made to responding police officers after the suspect 
has left the scene or after the suspect is under police 
control. Such an accusation to the responding police 
officers is NONTESTIMONIAL if made while the 
complainant is still facing an immediate threat of 
further violence or injury.  
The emphasis in Davis on the vulnerability of that specific 
911 caller and the apparent pattern in the post-Davis dispositions 
suggest that the admissibility of a 911 call reporting a crime of 
violence can be restated in this way: 
A complainant’s accusation about domestic or other 
violence in a 911 call is NONTESTIMONIAL if it 
reports a crime that is ongoing at the time of the call, 
or if it reports a crime that has just occurred and the 
caller still appears to be at immediate risk of further 
assault. Such an accusation in a 911 call is 
TESTIMONIAL if the violence has ended and the 
caller is not at immediate risk of further assault 
before the police respond.  
These rules provide guidance that is both accurate and 
workable in a trial court for typical cases of domestic violence 
and similar crimes of violence. They may not provide guidance 
for statements in other kinds of cases or even for domestic 
violence cases with atypical facts, but the Supreme Court has 
not determined how the Confrontation Clause applies in every 
case. The language of Davis will undoubtedly be quoted as other 
courts try to decide whether other kinds of statements are 
testimonial or nontestimonial. The post-Davis dispositions 
provide no further assistance in determining whether such 
extrapolation beyond the facts of Davis will produce accurate 
rules. 
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D. Initial History of the Post-Davis GVRs 
The Eleventh Circuit wrote the first opinion on remand in 
the GVR cases in a per curiam decision that reversed the 
conviction in United States v. Billingslea and remanded the case 
to the district court for a new trial.127 The opinion explained that 
the particular statement was testimonial under the test in Davis 
because there was no ongoing emergency at the time, and the 
only purpose of the interrogation was to obtain evidence of an 
earlier crime.128 The court held that admitting the statement was 
a confrontation violation because the defendant could not 
confront the unavailable declarant at trial and the defendant did 
not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at 
the time of interrogation.129 
In contrast to the action of the Eleventh Circuit in 
Billingslea, the California appellate court that reexamined its 
analysis in People v. Castellanos after the GVR continued to 
adhere to its earlier conclusion that there was no confrontation 
violation. The court found that the facts before it were closer to 
the facts of Davis than to the facts of Hammon.130 The statement 
in dispute was an accusation by a passenger in the car in which 
Castellanos had been trying to escape from pursuing officers. 
After Castellanos jumped out of the still-moving car and tried to 
run away, an officer went to the car to check on the other 
occupants.131 After the passenger was handcuffed, the passenger 
volunteered her perspective on the incident with several 
statements.132 One statement was an accusation that Castellanos 
had tried to hit an officer with the car when he drove away from 
an earlier traffic stop.133 
The California appellate court did not discuss whether the 
                                                          
127 No. 03-12483, 2006 WL 3201100 (11th Cir. Nov. 7, 2006). 
128 See id. at *2. 
129 See id. 
130 Nos. B175888, B181286, 2006 WL 3072370, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Oct. 31, 2006). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 See id. 
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emergency that created a threat of harm to the passenger ended 
when Castellanos abandoned the car and tried to flee on foot. 
Instead, the court declared that the important fact was the lack 
of interrogation by the police before the passenger made the 
accusation.134 That particular interpretation appears to have been 
rejected by footnote 1 of Davis, in which Justice Scalia stated 
that the lack of interrogation was not sufficient to define a 
statement as nontestimonial.135 The Davis footnote equated 
volunteered answers and responses to open-ended questions as 
equally objectionable as actual interrogation if the declarant is 
never subject to cross-examination. The California appellate 
court made no effort to explain how its view about interrogation 
was supported by or consistent with Davis. As a result, the 
California appellate opinion on remand from the GVR has the 
appearance of a rather weak effort to avoid recognizing that the 
end of the emergency meant the accusation was a testimonial 
statement under the definition in Davis. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals in State v. Warsame also 
adhered to its earlier holding that the prosecution could use an 
accusation by a victim that the defendant had threatened to kill 
her to prove a felony charge of Terroristic Threats.136 The 
statement was made to an officer at the scene by the victim after 
the defendant had left with the victim’s sister.137 After the 
prosecution could not locate the victim, the trial court ruled that 
Crawford made the victim’s statement inadmissible.138 That 
pretrial ruling was reversed on an appeal by the prosecution.139 
The appellate court held that an initial police-victim interaction 
at the scene does not involve interrogation, and that a resulting 
statement is not testimonial. On remand from the GVR, the 
appellate court accepted the State’s concession that the victim 
was no longer facing an ongoing emergency at the time she 
made some of her accusation, but it still concluded that her 
                                                          
134 See id. 
135 See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 n.1 (2006). 
136 State v. Warsame, 723 N.W.2d 637, 642-43 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
137 Id. at 639 
138 Id. 
139 State v. Warsame, 701 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005). 
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entire accusation was not a testimonial statement.140 
The Minnesota court reinterpreted the facts in Warsame as 
involving not one but three separate emergencies—the threat to 
the victim who made the accusation, the threat to the sister who 
had left the scene in the defendant’s car, and the threat to a 
second sister who was in the residence with a small cut to her 
hand.141 The threats to the sisters had barely been mentioned in 
the same court’s prior opinion.142 The court declared that the 
declarant did not have to be facing her own emergency at the 
time of the statement.143 All that was required was that there be 
an emergency—at another location and involving some other 
person–as long as that other emergency was related to the 
declarant’s situation so that questioning the declarant might 
clarify the other emergency.144 The court also did not require 
that the defendant be creating a threat at the time—the possible 
need for medical attention to the sister’s cut finger was enough 
for the emergency to continue.145 The Minnesota court made no 
effort to support this interpretation of Davis with any language 
from that opinion, leaving Warsame as another example of an 
appellate court’s effort to avoid applying the holding of Davis. 
 Later opinions on remand in other GVR cases recognized 
that a statement to the police after the emergency ends is 
testimonial under the test in Davis. In People v. Thomas, a 
California court concluded that a statement was testimonial 
because it was made to the police after the defendant had left the 
scene.146 In State v. Wright, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
concluded that a statement was testimonial because it was made 
to the police after the defendant was in custody.147 However, the 
Minnesota court also concluded that the dividing line between a 
testimonial and nontestimonial statement did not have to be the 
                                                          
140 Warsame, 723 N.W.2d at 641. 
141 Id.at 641-42. 
142 Warsame, 701 N.W.2d at 307. 
143 Warsame, 723 N.W.2d at 641. 
144 Id. at 641-42. 
145 Id. at 642. 
146 2006 WL 3775882, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
147 726 N.W.2d 464, 476 (Minn. 2007). 
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exact moment the suspect was taken into police custody.148 In 
Wright the court allowed the prosecution to use statements made 
by a 911 caller as the 911 operator was trying to reassure the 
caller that the emergency had ended, that the suspect really was 
in police custody, and that the caller could hang up.149 The 911 
operator was not interrogating the victim after the emergency 
was over, a fact that distinguished this case from the 911 
operator’s continued questioning that Davis suggested might 
have produced a testimonial statement.150 
Each appellate opinion on remand in Thomas and Wright also 
directed the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine if the 
defendant had forfeited his confrontation right by coercing the 
declarant from testifying. The Minnesota court in Wright 
concluded that the prosecution could introduce new evidence at 
the hearing, and rejected the defendant’s objection that 
expanding the record after conviction violated due process.151 
The California court in Thomas also stated that the prosecution 
could present evidence of coercion at an evidentiary hearing, 
without discussing whether the defendant could object to new 
evidence offered by the prosecution at such a hearing.152 On this 
issue there was no guidance in Davis, which left the forfeiture 
issue in Hammon for decision on remand without stating whether 
forfeiture had to be shown by evidence already in the record.153 
The Indiana Supreme Court did not discuss the possibility of a 
separate hearing on forfeiture, because it remanded the case to 
the trial court for a new trial.154 
A marked contrast to the opinions that interpret, apply, or 
extend Davis to the specific facts of the case can be found in the 
opinion on remand in Cross v. Commonwealth.155 This opinion 
from a Kentucky appellate court first presented nineteen 
                                                          
148 Id. at 474. 
149 Id. at 475. 
150 See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006). 
151 State v. Wright, 726 N.W.2d 464, 480-82. (Minn. 2007). 
152 People v. Thomas, 2006 WL 3775882, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
153 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280. 
154 Hammon v. State, 853 N.E.2d 277 (Ind. 2006). 
155 2007 WL 121823 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007). 
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paragraphs reciting the facts and an extended quotation of ten 
paragraphs from Davis. The opinion then concluded in a single 
short paragraph that a 911 call is nontestimonial if the caller is 
seeking emergency assistance; that meant there was no 
confrontation violation in admitting the statement of a 911 caller 
who reported that the assailant had left the scene in a taxicab.156 
The Kentucky court neither quoted the paragraph in Davis that 
described the emergency as ending when the assailant left the 
premises,157 nor discussed its apparent failure to apply the 
definition of an emergency set out in Davis. 
E.  Applications of Davis by Other Courts 
The initial group of post-Davis cases has provided a variety 
of explanations for deciding whether there was an ongoing 
emergency at the time a victim or witness made a statement to 
the police. On their facts, many of these cases reach results that 
are consistent with the rule that a statement by a victim after the 
suspect has left the scene or after the police have control of the 
suspect is testimonial and therefore not admissible without 
confrontation at trial. Other opinions show resistance to the 
Court’s definition of the end of an emergency. 
1.  Statements to Officers at the Crime Scene 
After Davis, several opinions discussed whether a statement 
at the scene to a responding officer was testimonial. For 
example, the Supreme Court of West Virginia concluded that the 
victim of a domestic dispute made a testimonial statement to 
responding officers because “[t]here was no emergency in 
progress when the deputies arrived, and the defendant had 
clearly departed the scene when the interrogation occurred.”158 
In a habeas case, a federal district court concluded that a child 
who had witnessed a domestic assault made a testimonial 
                                                          
156 Id. at *6. 
157 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277. 
158 State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 323 (W. Va. 2006). 
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statement because she spoke to a responding officer “when there 
was no emergency in progress. [The victim] was being treated 
for her injuries by paramedics and Petitioner had been arrested 
and taken out of the house.”159 A Kansas appellate court reached 
a consistent conclusion without discussion in ruling that a child’s 
statements about sexual abuse that were made to an officer well 
after the incidents had occurred were testimonial.160 The Oregon 
Court of Appeals reversed a conviction in a domestic abuse case 
because the prosecution rested on an accusation at the scene by 
the victim who did not testify; the statement had been made after 
the “defendant was gone. The emergency had dissipated, and the 
girlfriend was under no threat of immediate harm.”161 Several 
other courts have concluded that a statement is testimonial if it is 
made after the emergency has ended.162 
Other appellate courts have recognized the importance of 
identifying the end of the emergency, finding that a statement 
was not testimonial in cases in which the responding officers did 
not have control of the suspect. For instance, in Vinson v. 
State,163 a case whose facts resembled those of Hembertt,164 the 
Nebraska case in which the Petition for Certiorari was denied, 
the complainant met the responding officer and made the first 
accusations before the defendant entered the room. The court 
concluded that this accusation and subsequent accusations the 
complainant made after the officer saw the defendant were 
nontestimonial because they were all made at a time when the 
officer did not feel the scene was safe, and was still assessing 
                                                          
159 Cook v. McGrath, No. C 03-2719 JSW (PR), 2006 WL 2479111, at 
*6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2006). 
160 State v. Noah, No. 91,353, 2006 WL 1976505, at **5-6 (Kan. Ct. 
App. July 14, 2006). 
161 State v. Miles, 145 P.3d 242, 244 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). 
162 See, e.g., State v. Parks, 142 P.3d 720, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); 
State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506, 522-23 (Conn. 2006); Raile v. People, 148 
P.3d 126, 132-33 (Colo. 2006); State v. Bird, No. 32943-3-II, 2006 WL 
3201050, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2006). 
163 Nos. 01-05-00784-CR, 01-05-00785-CR, 2006 WL 2291000 (Tex. 
App. Aug. 10, 2006). 
164 See supra text accompanying notes 59-60. 
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whether he needed back-up assistance and whether he needed to 
place the defendant in the patrol car.165 
Some appellate courts have defined an emergency more 
broadly than the Davis facts. In People v. Carpenter,166 the 
responding officer was not able to interview the victim until he 
found a Spanish interpreter. The statements were made at the 
hospital when there was no longer any apparent threat that the 
declarant might be injured. The court rested its conclusion that 
there was the proper kind of emergency on the officer’s 
testimony that there might still be an ongoing emergency at the 
crime scene because: “there was an inordinate amount of blood 
at the location for there being only one victim . . . I was 
worried there may be other family members or small children 
that were unaccounted for . . .”167 In Garcia v. State, the 
appellate court concluded there was an ongoing emergency even 
though the domestic assault had ended and the defendant had left 
the scene, because the defendant had taken the parties’ child 
when he left and the complainant feared the child might have 
been injured when the defendant grabbed him from her.168 In 
State v. Alvarez, an Arizona appellate court followed the same 
reasoning in finding that a statement to officers by an injured 
victim identifying his assailants was not testimonial, even though 
the assault had ended and the assailants had fled; the court found 
it was sufficient that the victim still faced a medical 
emergency.169 
The opinion of the Eighth Circuit in United States v. 
Clemmons illustrates a similar effort to define an emergency 
more broadly than a threat of further injury to the declarant.170 
                                                          
165 Vinson v. State, Nos. 01-05-00784-CR, 01-05-00785-CR, 2006 WL 
2291000 at **7-9. 
166 No. E038769, 2006 WL 2278763, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 
2006). 
167 Id., at *6. 
168 No. 03-04-00718-CR, 2006 WL 3841539, at *4 (Tex. App. Dec. 29, 
2006). 
169 See State v. Alvarez, No. 2 CA-CR 2002-0084, 2006 WL 2790029, 
at *6 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2006). 
170 United States v. Clemmons, 461 F.3d 1057, (8th Cir. 2006). 
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This case involved a felon in possession of a firearm conviction 
in which the government’s evidence included the statement of an 
absent witness to a responding officer that the defendant had 
shot the witness. The responding officers had found the victim 
lying on the ground with a gunshot wound, talking on his cell 
phone in a calm voice.171 Nothing in the opinion suggested that 
the shooter was still present at the scene, or that the officers 
were concerned that the suspect was present and a threat to their 
safety. However, the court concluded that the statement was 
nontestimonial under Davis because the officer described his 
purpose in interrogating the victim as “[t]o investigate, one, his 
health to order him medical attention, and, two, try [] to figure 
out who did this to him.” The court then declared, “Any 
reasonable observer would understand that [the victim] was 
facing an ongoing emergency and that the purpose of the 
interrogation was to enable police assistance to meet that 
emergency.”172 This sentence describes the “emergency” from a 
different perspective than the Supreme Court considered in 
Davis. 
There were also cases in which the courts found that a 
statement at the scene was nontestimonial even though it was 
made after the defendant had left the scene or was under police 
control. For instance, a Wisconsin appellate court in a domestic 
assault case concluded that statements of the victim were 
nontestimonial without discussing whether the emergency had 
ended before the victim spoke to the responding officer.173 
Nothing in the opinion suggested that the officers were 
concerned that the suspect was still on the premises; instead the 
court focused on whether the declarant would have expected her 
excited utterances to be used at trial.174 A few other opinions 
presented a similar focus on the excitement of the victim.175 The 
                                                          
171 Id. at 1058-59. 
172 Id. at 1060-61. 
173 State v. Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d 136, 147-48 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). 
174 Id. 
175 See, e.g., State v. Ly, No. A05-1106, 2006 WL 2255692 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Aug. 8, 2006); In re Matter of German F., 821 N.Y.S.2d 410 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. 2006); State v. Reardon, 860 N.E.2d 141 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). 
KIRST 6/22/2007 1:11 AM 
672 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
common thread in these opinions is the absence of any 
discussion of whether the emergency had ended at the time the 
statement was made. That silence is a confirmation that there is 
no guarantee that the details of a definition adopted by the 
Supreme Court and applied by the Supreme Court in sorting the 
next twenty cases will be even recognized by other courts. 
2.  911 Calls 
Some appellate cases in which the challenged statement was 
made in a 911 call have followed the distinction between an 
ongoing emergency and a report after the emergency has ended. 
In two cases the, 911 caller was apparently facing an ongoing 
emergency. One court concluded that a statement was 
nontestimonial in a case in which the 911 call from a cell phone 
reported an intoxicated driver who had just thrown a beer bottle 
at the caller.176 Another court reached a similar conclusion about 
a 911 caller whose complaint that he had been rammed more 
than once by an intoxicated driver “described events as they 
were actually happening.”177 In addition, the importance of the 
end of the emergency under Davis was recognized by a Texas 
court that concluded that a 911 caller made a testimonial 
statement where the caller’s report of a domestic assault at her 
own house was made ten to fifteen minutes after the assault, 
when she and her children were at her mother’s house and there 
was little or no threat of imminent danger.178 
As for the cases involving statements at the scene, not every 
case involving a 911 call used the Davis definition of an 
emergency to determine if a statement was testimonial. In State 
v. Camarena, the Oregon Court of Appeals concluded that an 
accusation of domestic assault in a 911 call that was made a 
minute after the assault was not testimonial because the facts 
were more similar to Davis than to Hammon.179 The opinion did 
                                                          
176 See Cook v. State, 199 S.W.3d 495, 496-98 (Tex. App. 2006). 
177 Jackson v. State, 931 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
178 Santacruz v. State, No. 14-05-00227-CR, 2006 WL 2506382, at *2 
(Tex. App. Aug. 31, 2006). 
179 See State v. Camarena, 145 P.3d 267, 275 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). 
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not directly discuss the significance of the 911 caller’s 
immediate statement that the assailant “took the car and he 
left.”180 Instead, the opinion simply asserted that it was more 
likely the caller was seeking protection against renewal of the 
assault than just reporting a past crime, a statement without any 
apparent support in the transcript of the 911 call quoted in the 
opinion. The opinion then declared that the intent of the 
declarant did not matter since “the dispositive distinction . . . is 
the primary purpose of the interrogation.”181 Moreover, the 
opinion did not explain why this proposition negated the fact the 
emergency had ended. 
In several other opinions the courts did not discuss whether a 
nontestimonial statement had to be made by a declarant who was 
facing an immediate emergency. For instance, an Ohio court 
declared the purpose of a 911 call was to meet an ongoing 
emergency without mentioning the location of the defendant at 
the time; he clearly was gone when the police arrived.182 The 
Seventh Circuit concluded that a 911 call was a nontestimonial 
statement where the caller was describing an ongoing gun battle 
outside her apartment.183 The court mentioned that the caller did 
not identify herself because she was concerned for her own 
safety,184 but the facts do not suggest there was an immediate 
threat to the 911 caller. An Oregon court similarly did not 
discuss any threat to the 911 caller in reviewing a conviction for 
being a felon in possession of a firearm where the 911 call by 
the defendant’s mother was a report that he had threatened to 
shoot himself.185 An appellate court in California concluded that 
a statement in a 911 call by the sister of an assault victim during 
the assault was not testimonial without discussing whether the 
sister also was being threatened.186 Finally, an appellate court in 
                                                          
180 Id. at 269. 
181 Id. at 275 (emphasis in original). 
182 State v. Chambers, No. 87323, 2006 WL 2916194, at *3 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Oct. 12, 2006). 
183 See United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006). 
184 Id. at 841-42. 
185 See State v. Skiles, 139 P.3d 1006 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). 
186 See People v. Campos, No. B186815, 2006 WL 3198793, at **6-7 
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Mississippi concluded that a 911 call by the defendant’s wife in 
which she reported that she had just seen the defendant 
abducting the wife’s friend and driving away was not testimonial 
because the wife was trying to initiate an investigation of the 
current situation and not recounting a past crime.187 
F.  An Initial Appraisal 
Identifying the pattern in the post-Davis certiorari 
dispositions does not necessarily add any explanation beyond the 
language of Davis for the Court’s decision to make the existence 
of an ongoing emergency such an important factor in the 
confrontation analysis of statements by domestic violence 
victims. However, it is possible to consider some effects of that 
decision. 
First, the rules provided by Davis for 911 calls and 
statements to responding officers have refined prior 
confrontation doctrine. In White v. Illinois,188 the Supreme Court 
held that there was no confrontation violation when the 
prosecution used an excited utterance of an available declarant. 
The Court in White limited the grant of certiorari to the 
confrontation question,189 so it did not define an excited 
utterance and did not have to decide whether the statements in 
the case were actually the proper kind of excited utterances. In 
Crawford, the majority opinion by Justice Scalia cast doubt on 
White and suggested that an excited utterance had to be made 
“immediat[ely] upon the hurt received, and before [the 
declarant] had time to devise or contrive any thing for her own 
advantage.”190 Davis modified both of these prior discussions 
without mentioning either White or the Crawford gloss on White. 
After Davis, a statement by a declarant who is still under the 
stress of a startling event may fit within the excited utterance 
                                                          
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2006). 
187 See Williams v. State, No. 2005-KA-01383-COA, 2006 WL 
3008133, at *3 (Miss. Ct. App. Oct. 24,  2006). 
188 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
189 Id. at 351 &  n. 4. 
190 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n. 8 (2004). 
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hearsay exception, but those facts will not resolve the 
confrontation question. The statement will be testimonial, even if 
the declarant is still under stress, if the emergency ended when 
the suspect fled or the officers had the suspect under control.  
Second, the phrasing of Davis appears to minimize the need 
to choose in most cases between the intent of the questioner or 
the intent of the declarant in identifying a testimonial statement. 
Neither should matter in a typical case because the rules depend 
on an objective interpretation of the circumstances in which the 
statement was made. Justice Scalia illustrated that process by 
making assumptions about what a typical person would have 
been thinking and intending in the circumstances described in 
the record. Perhaps that leaves the door open for a contrary 
conclusion, only on substantially different facts. A defendant 
might show that the circumstances were atypical because either 
the questioner or declarant was explicitly trying to create a 
substitute for future testimony instead of trying to resolve the 
immediate emergency. The prosecution might show that the 
emergency was more extensive than in most similar 
circumstances. 
In addition, the rule in Davis has provided a substitute for 
judicial evaluation of reliability, the perceived defect in Roberts 
that Crawford sought to eliminate. However, Davis has raised 
several questions of its own. Did Davis make confrontation 
doctrine more predictable and consistent? Does Davis support 
Justice Scalia’s emphasis that whether a statement is testimonial 
depends on facts beyond the control of the prosecution or 
police? Some actual cases suggest the complexity of answering 
these questions. For example, in the Nebraska prosecution in 
Hembertt191 there was still an ongoing emergency because the 
two responding officers met the victim first, while in the 
Massachusetts prosecution in Rodriguez192 the emergency came 
to an end more quickly because two of the four responding 
officers contacted the victim and two located the suspect. These 
cases demonstrate that the application of Davis may depend on 
                                                          
191 See supra text accompanying notes 59-60. 
192 See supra text accompanying note 81. 
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how many officers are dispatched to a complaint or on the 
officers’ strategy in responding at the scene. 
The rule in Davis can also make the application of 
confrontation doctrine depend on the declarant’s choice of 
words. A declarant who wants the prosecution of a domestic 
batterer to succeed without the testimony of the declarant should 
tell the responding officer immediately about the details of the 
crime and the identity of the assailant before the officers locate 
the assailant. Such a declarant should not immediately tell the 
responding officers that the assailant has ended the immediate 
emergency by leaving the scene. Conversely, a declarant who 
wants to preserve the option to preclude the prosecution of the 
batterer by ignoring a summons should ask the responding 
officer for protection but not explain the details of the crime or 
identify the assailant as the specific cause of any injury until the 
officer has the assailant under control. A 911 caller who says 
the assailant has left the scene similarly would preserve the 
option to block the prosecution by ignoring a subpoena, while a 
911 caller who expresses fear that the assault will continue or 
resume would permit the prosecution to proceed on the basis of 
the nontestimonial statement. 
The defendant’s conduct at the scene can sometimes also 
affect the confrontation analysis. For instance, the defendant in 
the Nebraska prosecution in Hembertt193 could have converted 
the victim’s nontestimonial statement into a testimonial statement 
that would have been excluded on a confrontation objection by 
coming out of the residence immediately, so the responding 
officers would know they had control before the victim made an 
accusation. 
The purpose of considering these factual variations is neither 
to suggest that declarants will often try to game the system with 
strategic decisions about what to say and how to say it, nor to 
suggest that the Court’s holding in Davis can be easily 
manipulated by law enforcement training. The purpose is rather 
to ask whether the test is likely to regularly lead to outcomes 
that are consistent with the policies the rule is intended to 
                                                          
193 See supra text accompanying notes 59-60. 
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implement. On that basis, the different outcomes from these 
factual variations appear quite removed from any original 
purpose of the Confrontation Clause. Crawford described the 
principal evil as the civil-law mode of criminal procedure that 
used ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.194 
Davis reemphasized that “it is the trial use of, not the 
investigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial statements which 
offends [the Confrontation Clause].”195 What Davis did not 
explain is why its test appears to depend on how statements are 
collected. 
The factual variations also highlight how much the discussion 
of the objective circumstances in which a statement was made 
directs attention away from confrontation as a right of the 
defendant. Perhaps the Justice who lamented that an earlier 
Court used “reasoning [that] abstracts from the right to its 
purposes, and then eliminates the right”196 should ask if the rule 
in Davis illustrates the danger of abstracting from the right to a 
surrogate that eliminates any mention of the person who holds 
the right created by the constitutional text. 
II.  DAVIS AND OVERALL CONFRONTATION DOCTRINE 
The Davis opinion discussed overall confrontation doctrine in 
the course of applying the Confrontation Clause to the specific 
facts of Davis and Hammon. Other courts and attorneys now 
must determine whether they can apply the language of Davis 
beyond its facts. 
The Davis opinion often warns the reader not to expect to 
find a global statement of confrontation doctrine. The analysis 
begins with an explicit self-limitation that it is addressing the 
topic “[w]ithout attempting to produce an exhaustive 
classification of all conceivable statements–or even all 
conceivable statements in response to police interrogation–as 
                                                          
194 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004). 
195 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 n. 6 (2006) (emphasis 
in original). 
196 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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either testimonial or nontestimonial.”197 This is followed with a 
further warning about the scope of the opinion because “it 
suffices to decide the present cases to hold”198 with a rule only 
for certain kinds of police interrogation. This limitation is 
explained with a footnote that the holding refers to interrogations 
because those are the facts “in the cases presently before us.”199 
Lest someone consider Davis as establishing whether a 911 
operator is always a law enforcement officer for confrontation 
purposes, another footnote made clear that Davis assumed that 
the 911 operator was part of law enforcement: “For purposes of 
this opinion (and without deciding the point), we consider their 
acts to be acts of the police.”200 Davis said that in both 
Crawford and Davis, the holding “makes it unnecessary to 
consider whether and when statements to someone other than 
law enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial.’”201 On the facts of 
Davis, the Court decided only whether the early portion of the 
911 call was testimonial because the Petition for Certiorari 
“asked [the Court] to classify only [the caller’s] early statements 
identifying Davis as her assailant.”202 
In a direct response to the argument by Justice Thomas in 
his dissenting opinion that the Davis test was unworkable, 
Justice Scalia repeated his statement that “our holding is not an 
‘exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements . . .’”203 
but that it was “rather a resolution of the cases before us and 
those like them.”204 He defended his rule as “the rule we adopt 
for the narrow situations we address.”205 His concluding 
remarks about the possibility that Hammon had forfeited his 
right to assert a confrontation objection began with the caution 
that “[w]e take no position on the standard necessary to 
                                                          
197 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 2274 n. 1. 
200 Id. at 2274 n. 2. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 2277 
203 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 n.5 (2006). 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 2278-79 n. 5. 
KIRST 6/22/2007 1:11 AM 
 CONFRONTATION RULES AFTER DAVIS 679 
demonstrate such forfeiture.”206 
Justice Scalia’s ten-fold caution about the limited issue 
addressed in Davis may not stop other courts and lawyers from 
invoking the language in Davis on other confrontation issues. 
Small differences between the phrasing in Crawford and Davis 
may draw particular attention. For example, in Davis, Justice 
Scalia restated the Crawford holding that a custodial statement of 
an accomplice who did not appear at trial was inadmissible 
without confrontation because it was testimonial.207 In Davis, he 
wrote a broader statement when he stated that “[o]nly” a 
testimonial statement can “cause the declarant to be a ‘witness’ 
within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. It is the 
testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other 
hearsay that . . . is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.”208 
Justice Scalia did not mention in Davis that Crawford had not 
used the word “only” to limit the scope of the Confrontation 
Clause to testimonial statements; Crawford’s phrasing was that 
testimonial statements were the “primary object” of the 
Confrontation Clause.209 In Davis, Justice Scalia followed a 
quotation from Crawford about the “focus” of the Confrontation 
Clause on testimonial hearsay with the stronger assertion that 
testimonial hearsay was “[a] limitation so clearly reflected in the 
text of the constitutional provision [that it] must fairly be said to 
mark out not merely its ‘core’ but its perimeter.”210 
Justice Scalia bolstered his statement in Davis that 
testimonial hearsay was the perimeter of the right of 
confrontation with historical evidence not presented in Crawford. 
He asserted: “We are not aware of any early American case 
invoking the Confrontation Clause or the common-law right to 
confrontation that did not clearly involve testimony as thus 
defined.”211 That might be a useful hypothesis for examining the 
                                                          
206 Id. at 2280. 
207 See id. at 2273 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-
54 (2004)). 
208 Id. 
209 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53. 
210 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006). 
211 Id. at 2274-75. 
KIRST 6/22/2007 1:11 AM 
680 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
historical record, but there are at least two reasons to ask how 
much it supports the proposition for which it was offered. First, 
the value of evidence that a particular doctrine was not used 
depends on whether there were instances where it could have 
been used and was deliberately not used. The same result would 
follow if there was no occasion to use the doctrine, or if those 
who might have used the doctrine were not the ones who knew 
about it. Second, it is not a true statement about history. For 
example, Chief Justice Marshall sitting as a Circuit Justice 
excluded evidence of private conversations that were offered as 
co-conspirator statements in the well-known prosecution of 
Aaron Burr.212 These questions about the historical argument 
suggest caution in expecting Davis to serve as a reliable source 
for new issues. 
The final discussion in Davis about the standard for 
determining a possible forfeiture of the right of confrontation 
provides a strong contrast with the many cautions about the 
limited issues addressed in Davis.213 The discussion provides 
greater detail than might have been expected for what is labeled 
as advisory dictum on an issue that might or might not arise on 
remand. The Indiana courts had not relied on forfeiture and the 
parties had not briefed the issue. Justice Scalia did not discuss 
why the forfeiture doctrine was supported by the historical 
evidence he presented in Crawford; he also did not explain how 
this nontextual interpretation was consistent with the text of the 
Confrontation Clause. 
Omissions from Davis also may have an effect on the 
development of confrontation doctrine for other facts. Davis did 
not mention Idaho v. Wright,214 a prosecution for child sexual 
abuse in which Justice Scalia joined Justice O’Connor’s majority 
opinion that found a confrontation violation in the prosecution 
use of a child victim’s hearsay statements. Davis was consistent 
with Crawford, which also omitted Wright, even though Justice 
                                                          
212 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.C Va. 1807) (No. 
14,694).  See also Randolph Jonakait, The Too-Easy Historical Assumptions 
of Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 219, 228-29 (2005). 
213 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80. 
214 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
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Scalia’s majority opinion in Crawford cataloged the Court’s 
other confrontation opinions. 
III.  LOOKING AHEAD 
A Petition for Certiorari that became a new hold on the 
Court’s docket also provides an apt illustration of the Supreme 
Court’s search for stable confrontation doctrine. The facts of this 
case began with a 1982 death that led to the murder conviction 
of Ralph Earnest on the basis of a custodial confession of his 
alleged confederate.215 On appellate review, the New Mexico 
Supreme Court reversed that conviction on the basis of Douglas 
v. Alabama,216 because the defendant never had an opportunity 
to cross-examine the declarant.217 The State’s 1985 Petition for 
Certiorari resulted in an order for GVR by the Court for 
reconsideration in light of Lee v. Illinois, the case in which 
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion discussed the interlocking 
confession theory.218 This was an atypical GVR, because Justice 
Rehnquist added a concurring opinion joined by three other 
Justices.219 In his concurrence, he suggested that Douglas had 
been supplanted in part by Ohio v. Roberts220 and that after Lee, 
the proper test was not cross-examination, but rather, 
reliability.221 The Earnest opinion was the high-water mark for 
the reliability theory in the Supreme Court, attracting four votes 
but not a majority.222 It was also the last confrontation opinion 
before Justice Scalia joined the Court. 
On remand, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the 
                                                          
215 See State v. Earnest, 703 P.2d 872 (1985). 
216 380 U.S. 415 (1965). 
217 See Earnest, 703 P.2d at 872. 
218 See New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648 (1986). 
219 See id. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell & 
O’Connor, JJ., concurring). 
220 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
221 See New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649-50. 
222 See generally Roger Kirst, The Procedural Dimension of 
Confrontation Doctrine, 66 NEB. L. REV. 485, 521-23 (1987). 
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conviction.223 This time the defendant filed what was the second 
Petition for Certiorari in the case; it was denied.224 The denial 
of Earnest’s habeas corpus petition in federal court was 
eventually affirmed by the Tenth Circuit in 1996.225 The 
defendant then filed the third Petition for Certiorari in his case; 
it also was denied.226 
After Crawford, Earnest filed a new petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in state court.227 The New Mexico District Court 
concluded that Crawford was retroactive and granted the 
petition.228 The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the order 
that the State release Earnest or elect to retry him.229 The court 
described the situation and its conclusion: 
It is beyond dispute that since Crawford, the rest of 
the nation knows now what the New Mexico Supreme 
Court announced in 1985: under the Sixth 
Amendment, statements from an alleged accomplice 
to an officer are inadmissible unless the declarant is 
unavailable and the defendant had an opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant. 
* * * 
Our decision is limited to the very special facts of 
this case, highlighted by the fact that the very law 
this Court applied to Earnest’s case twenty years ago 
has now been vindicated, which entitles him to the 
same new trial he should have received back then.230 
The State of New Mexico then filed the fourth Petition for 
Certiorari in this case.231 That petition was distributed for the 
                                                          
223 State v. Earnest, 744 P.2d 539 (N.M. 1987). 
224 Earnest v. New Mexico, 484 U.S. 924 (1987). 
225 Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1996). 
226 Earnest v. Dorsey, 519 U.S. 1016 (1996). 
227 See State v. Forbes, 119 P.3d 144 (N.M. 2005). 
228 See id. 
229 Id.  
230 Id. at 146, 148-49. 
231 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, New Mexico v. Forbes (U.S., No. 
05-644, Nov. 17, 2005). 
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Court’s Conference of May 11, 2006, as was the petition in 
Whorton v. Bockting raising the same retroactivity issue; only 
the Petition in Whorton was granted.232 The Court took no 
action on the petition of New Mexico for several months while 
Whorton was being decided. During the time the New Mexico 
petition was on hold in the United States Supreme Court, the 
State of New Mexico tried to obtain an untainted conviction of 
Earnest by calling the hearsay declarant as a witness at the new 
trial.233 When the declarant refused to testify, the State released 
Earnest from prison.234 After the Court held in Whorton235 that 
Crawford is not retroactive, it denied the New Mexico 
petition.236 That ended the prosecution of Earnest.237 This 
resolution may be further evidence that the 1987 opinion in 
Earnest in particular was a step in the wrong direction, but there 
is still more work to be done as the courts undertake the 
complex task of reevaluating all the confrontation doctrine 
developed in recent decades. 
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